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Most the human population will experience a traumatic event during their lifespan and 
will then cope with such trauma in a wide variety of ways. It is well documented that traumatic 
events are associated with both short and long-term psychological distress and that a small 
number of those trauma-exposed individuals will even develop a mental health disorder such as 
PTSD. In more recent empirical studies, some trauma-exposed individuals have been found to 
experience what has been labeled posttraumatic growth (PTG), or positive personal and 
psychological changes after experiencing trauma. However, there is significant controversy 
regarding PTG and its relationship with posttraumatic stress. This project attempts to provide 
clarity to one area of research about posttraumatic growth: how the physiological response of 
cardiac vagal regulation differs between those with PTSD and those with reported PTG.  It was 
expected that individuals with PTG will not statistically differ from healthy controls on mean 
RSA. The findings confirm the proposed relationship between cardiac vagal tone, measured 
through RSA, and PTG.  This study exemplifies that PTG is not an adaptive response to 
traumatic experiences, but instead a predictor of cardiac vagal rigidity.  In each phase, RSA and 
heart period are lower in the PTG group, signifying less parasympathetic control over respiration 
and heart activity. More importantly, absence of cardiac vagal regulation post-aversive image 
task accompanied by lower RSA in PTG during this period strongly suggests that this construct 
is characterized by extreme affect dysregulation. A limitation in this study is that the sample was 
homogenous and only females participated in the laboratory portion of the study, which hinders 
the generalizability. Future research should investigate cardiac vagal activity with a stronger 
experimental manipulation, which can be done by using specific trauma centered memories or 
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Introduction: Posttraumatic Growth versus PTSD 
Most of the human population will experience a traumatic event during their lifespan and 
will then cope with such trauma in a wide variety of ways (Bonanno, 2004). Thankfully, most 
people manage even the most severe stressors and traumas well. They can maintain daily 
routines, interact with family and friends, and experience positive emotions despite their 
exposure to adverse experiences. Others, though, experience problematic distress and even 
psychopathology that can include depression, anxiety, and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 
But rather than being only neutral or negative, could experiencing a trauma be a springboard to 
something positive for certain people? And if so, how? 
It is well documented that traumatic events are associated with both short and long term 
psychological distress (Galea, Nandi, & Vlahov, 2005) and that a small number of those trauma-
exposed individuals will even develop a mental health disorder (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). Conversely, the positive effects of traumatic events have been a prominent 
theme throughout history and are frequently discussed in literature and philosophy (e.g. 
Kierkegaard, 1983). In more recent empirical studies, some trauma-exposed individuals have 
been found to experience what has been labeled posttraumatic growth (PTG), or positive 
personal and psychological changes after experiencing trauma (Zoellner & Maercker, 2006). 
According to proponents of this idea (e.g., Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004), PTG occurs when 
individuals become stronger and create a more meaningful life in the wake of trauma. This can 
include a renewed appreciation of life, acting on new opportunities, improved relationships, and 
enhanced personal strengths. PTG is thought to occur after both natural and man-made traumatic 
events, including life-threatening disease, war, abuse, and death of loved ones (Zoellner & 




depression and anxiety after a traumatic event, they will then grow psychologically and 
emotionally as a result. 
However, there is significant controversy regarding PTG and its relationship with 
posttraumatic stress (Linley & Joseph, 2004; Zoellner & Maercker, 2006). Different theorists 
have proposed highly diverse models of PTG. For instance, PTG has been conceptualized as both 
an outcome from the traumatic event (Shaefer & Moos, 1998; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004) and a 
coping strategy (Affleck & Tennen, 1996). There is even speculation if PTG is genuine positive 
change or a maladaptive, self-deceptive coping mechanism (Frazier et al., 2009; Hall, Hobfoll, 
Canetti, Johnson, & Galea, 2009). 
Theorists in posttraumatic growth research argue the possibility of positive psychological 
change occurs because of the struggle with a highly challenging life circumstances (Tedeschi & 
Calhoun, 2004). However, PTG also depends on people’s perceptions that they have experienced 
growth, and so some argue that posttraumatic growth is a positive illusion rather than an 
objective improvement in psychological wellbeing (Frazier et al., 2009; Mancini, Littleton, & 
Grills, 2016). Further, the research on the relationship between PTSD and PTG has produced 
inconsistent and conflicting results.  
          Given this controversy, significant questions arise. What is the actual relationship between 
PTSD and PTG? Are they co-occurring phenomena or opposite ends of the same spectrum? If 
they are opposites, do different trauma types produce different outcomes? Are PTSD and PTG 
manifested different physiologically? Will people who score highly on measures of PTG respond 
to stimuli differently than someone who scores highly on measures of PTSD? How is perceived 
self-reported PTG related to actual growth? Is PTG an adaptive response to traumatic events or 




literature, this project will attempt to provide clarity to one area of research: how the 
physiological response of cardiac vagal regulation differs between those with PTSD and those 
with reported PTG. A significant portion of the literature and research surrounding trauma has 
focused on the negative aspects of post-trauma functioning. To understand the complicated 
construct of PTG it may be beneficial to examine the extant research on PTSD to gain a better 





















Chapter 1: Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
Epidemiological research indicates that most people will experience a traumatic event 
during their life (Morina, Wicherts, Lobbrecht, & Priebe, 2014). Traumatic events can lead to 
different forms of psychopathology, with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) being the most 
documented disorder after trauma. Epidemiological studies reveal that rates of PTSD vary 
depending on the type of trauma: about 55% after rape, 35% after childhood sexual or physical 
abuse, about 17% after physical assault, and about 7% after severe accidents (Kessler, Sonnega, 
Bromet & Nelson, 1995; Maercker, Michael, Fehm, Becker, & Margraf, 2004). Most individuals 
with PTSD appear to suffer for several years then gradually recover functioning, but still live 
lives clouded by vestiges of their former symptoms, such as persistent sleep problems, 
occasional intrusive thoughts, planned avoidance, and interpersonal isolation (Tomb, 1994). 
Others, though, maintain high levels of PTSD symptoms for many years or are functionally 
impaired for the duration of their life (Goldfeld, Mollica, & Pesavento, 1988). 
The current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (fifth edition; 
American Psychiatric Association, 2013) contains specific diagnostic criteria for PTSD. Chief 
among these are symptoms that must develop after exposure to a traumatic event and be present 
for more than one month. Four distinct symptom clusters characterize the disorder. First, 
involuntary re-experiencing of the traumatic events in one or more of the following ways: 
recurrent dreams, flashbacks, intense cue sensitivity, recurrent recollections, or physiological 
reactivity. Second, persistent avoidance of external or internal cues related with the traumatic 
experience is demonstrated in one or more of the following ways: avoiding thoughts, inability to 
recall, avoiding activities, diminished interest, detachment, flat affect, and sense of dim future. 




memory problems associated with the traumatic event, negative thoughts about one’s self or 
others, distorted sense of blame for one’s self or other associated with the traumatic event, stuck 
in extreme emotions associated with the trauma, reduced interest in pre-trauma activities, and 
feeling detached, isolated, or disconnected from other people. Finally, persistent increased 
arousal in two or more of the following is the fourth symptom cluster of PTSD: problems 
sleeping, irritability, hypervigilance, difficulty concentrating, and heightened startle reflex. 
Over 80% of PTSD diagnoses are accompanied by at least one comorbid disorder, the 
most common being depression (Kilpatrick et al., 2003; Araujo et al., 2014). The depressive 
symptoms associated with PTSD further exacerbate the emotional, physical, social, and 
psychological quality of life deficits (Araujo et al, 2014). Depression is not the only comorbid 
disorder typically manifested with PTSD, as 50% of PTSD diagnoses are accompanied by two or 
more comorbid disorders (Kilpatrick et al., 2003). Some other common comorbidities are alcohol 
and substance abuse that range from 21.6% to 43% (Feldner et al., 2009), prevalence of 
comorbid panic attacks 35% (Falsetti & Resnick, 1997), and antisocial personality disorder with 
48% comorbidity (Keane & Wolfe, 1990).  
PTSD is associated with mental and physical distress and high economic costs (Nemeroff 
et al., 2006). Individuals with PTSD experience greatly decreased quality of life and functional 
difficulties (Mendlowicz & Stein, 2000). Epidemiologic studies (Breslau, Davis, Andreski, & 
Peterson, 1991; Kessler, Sonnega, Bromet, Hughes, & Nelson, 1995) found prevalence for PTSD 
of 7.8% to 9.2%, with women experiencing a diagnosis at two times higher rates than men. In an 
archival analysis of data, researchers measured the impact PTSD had on functioning and quality 
of life (Mendolowicz & Stein, 2000). A decreased quality of life outcome was more common in 




female veterans with PTSD (Zatzick et al., 1997). Veterans with PTSD were found to be more 
likely to report marital, parental, and family adjustment problems. Overall, PTSD is associated 
with elevated odds of poor functioning in self-reported physical health status, days in bed, and 
role functioning across genders (Mendlowicz & Stein, 2000). 
Persons with partial PTSD – i.e., having fewer than the required number of DSM 
criterion or symptoms – report significantly more problems in work than trauma exposed 
individuals without PTSD (Mendolowicz & Stein, 2000). Individuals with full PTSD and partial 
PTSD report comparable levels of family and social interference. Partial PTSD approaches the 
same level of functional interference as PTSD in several quality of life domains. This highlights 
the need for effective intervention and treatment even if someone may not meet “full criteria.” 
But, even with treatment, PTSD often leaves a residual functional effect on people despite the 
remission of their clinical symptoms (Morina et al., 2014). There have been several explanations 
for this phenomenon put forward. First, PTSD can result in altered cognitive appraisals of one’s 
self and the environment that can affect one’s capacity to function healthily. People with PTSD 
ruminate on the trauma or exaggerate the perceived threat or likelihood of re-experiencing the 
trauma (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). This form of habitual thinking can contribute to occupational, 
social, and psychological impairments. Second, PTSD can result in social isolation, which can 
perpetuate negative affect. Emotional numbing and detachment predict reduced psychosocial 
functioning, especially in post-trauma adjustment (Riggs, Byrne, Weathers, & Litz, 1998; 
Samper, Taft, King, & King, 2004). Individuals with the disorder may withdraw from social 
relationships because of the active PTSD avoidance symptoms and consequently develop 
socially avoidant habits and behavior. Even when PTSD symptoms abate, these individuals now 




Relatedly, the perceived absence of supportive relationships is one of the strongest 
predictors for the development of PTSD (Brewin, Andrews, & Valentine, 2000). Social support 
diminishes the sense of threat following traumatic events, which protects against anxiety, 
depression, and PTSD symptoms (Charuvastra & Cloitre, 2008). Additionally, strong social 
relationships are predictive of wellbeing aside from buffering from the harmful effects of stress 
(Argyle, 2001). Social support may not only protect people from pathological reactions to stress 
but may also promote positive effects on wellbeing by improving social relationships. 
Evolutionary and Modern History of PTSD 
Although PTSD is a relatively recent diagnostic phenomenon, making its debut in the 
DSM-III after the end of the Vietnam War, the collection of symptoms it is significantly older. 
Evidence of PTSD can be found wherever catastrophic experiences have occurred, dating back to 
our early ancestors who lived in a daunting and relentless world in which they experienced life-
threatening stressors regularly. How did the functional impairments of PTSD, which appear 
intrinsically maladaptive, survive natural selection? Traumatized individuals are impaired at 
several levels, which should be selected against by evolution (Beahrs, 1990). Individual survival 
is endangered by heightened vulnerability to minor stressors, overt self-destructive actions, and 
reckless endangerment. Reproductive success is impaired by difficulty maintaining relationships 
and sexual dysfunction. The maladaptive features of PTSD are problematic in a rapidly changing 
environment that requires adaptive flexibility and small interpersonal boundaries. 
Hominization occurred in the African Savanna, and mankind spent much of its history in 
primitive settings prior to the advent of civilization (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989). This environment, 
stable for extended periods of time, fostered the selection of humans’ response to stress and 




(e.g., natural disaster, illness, predation, human conflicts). The features of what we now call 
PTSD evolved to enable mankind to adapt to specific environments in which threats occurred in 
a repetitive and stereotypical form.    
The savannah provided a stable environment to hunter gather societies and successive 
ancestors of the species encountered the common sources of danger. Natural selection would 
have favored the survival of those most flexible to responding to threat (Marks, 1987). Natural 
selection in a stable environment fostered the refinement of innate fear responses that allowed 
humans to react automatically to common and stereotypic threats (Silove, 1999). However, as 
populations grew, migration occurred into varied environments, causing expanding groups to 
encounter new threats to survival. Because the neocortex developed later, early human ancestors 
lacked the ability to make cognitive discriminations about risks associated with novel threats; 
they had yet to develop the capacity for language which would have fostered the communication 
about new sources of danger to fellow group members (Cantor, 2005). Hominids spread to new 
environments and terrains, natural selection favored the reproductive success of those who 
learned most efficiently to identify and avoid new sources of threat. As such, PTSD likely 
reflects defensive behaviors that were adaptive in our ancestral past and have arisen via natural 
selection, but that become maladaptive due to the level of the responses one is experiencing 
(Cantor, 2005). 
One of the acknowledged limitations of evolutionary theories is their inability to direct 
empirical testing and dearth of discovered “psychological fossils”. It is possible that PTSD may 
be a spandrel and has no relationship to survival and reproductive success (Silove, 1999). The 




survival advantage to the species (Gould & Lewontin, 1979). Therefore, it is possible that PTSD 
is a historically modern response to trauma. 
Extant historical texts reveal numerous individuals with behavior consistent with what we 
now call PTSD symptoms, with reported cases of agitation, dissociation, or terrifying nightmares 
(see Birmes, Hatton, Brunet, & Schmitt, 2003 for a review). Ancient literary sources suggest that 
most such psychopathology is associated with trauma and war. The earliest evidence of PTSD 
symptoms is even found in the world’s oldest written literature, from the Epic of Gilgamesh to 
The Iliad and The Odyssey (Birmes et al, 2003). Early historical writers reported cases of 
agitation, terrifying nightmares, and other unusual behavior in the heroes of their stories. It was 
because of these stories that early philosophers developed their theories of human nature and 
emotion.  
During the 17th century, Rene Descartes observed that events that caused significant fear 
can change human behavior even after the event had ended (Birmes et al., 2003). During the 18th 
century, the main references about psychological reactions to trauma were restricted to 
philosophical or literary pieces. Eventually, medical doctors became more aware of the impact 
trauma had on the mind; especially war (Briole, Lebigot, & Lafont, 1998). Several decades later, 
the American Civil War provided an opportunity for observing cases of posttrauma psychosis 
(Turnball, 1998). 
The American Civil War provided an abundance of historical accounts demonstrating the 
existence of PTSD (Tomb, 1994; Fellman, Gordon, & Sutherland, 2014). Although over a 
million Americans were killed in this conflict, this number fails to represent the psychological 
and emotional scars that were inflicted during this time of war. The Civil War occurred in a time 




of the war, returning soldiers were afflicted with terrible physical wounds, malaria, chronic 
diarrhea, and often psychologically destroyed (Fellman et al., 2014). The Civil War produced 
large number of soldiers who complained of weakness, heart palpitations, and chest pain, which 
were attributed to physical stress and referred to as soldier’s heart, effort syndrome, DaCosta’s 
syndrome, and irritable heart (Tomb, 1994).  The previous isolated anecdotes of posttraumatic 
stress symptoms during the Civil War became a medical phenomenon during and after World 
War I (WWI). 
WWI produced the term shell shock to describe PTSD symptomatology, which 
highlighted the physiological arousal seen in combat veterans (Andreasen, 2010). The shell 
shock theory proposed the idea of predisposition, weakened adaptive capacities, and a shocked 
nervous system and mind.  Shell shock was the result of a brain injury from artillery warfare. 
When uninjured soldiers expressed the symptoms, it was recognized as a physical reaction to 
combat stress (e.g., memory loss, neurosis, fatigue, dizziness). The circumstances of each war 
can affect the psyche of soldiers in different ways. World War I was fought in the trenches of 
Europe and was marked with artillery bombardments, which gave rise to terms “shell shock” and 
“gas hysteria,” a fear of a poisonous gas attack.  
During the Second World War (WWII), medical and psychological observations focused 
on the psychophysiological responses and loss of impulse control of those affected by trauma 
(Andreasen, 2010). Individuals who survived concentration camps showed severe biological, 
psychological and social consequences (Van de Kolk et al., 1996). Shortly after WWII the first 
edition of the DSM was published, which included the diagnosis of gross-stress reaction 
(Andreasen, 2010). This was an ill-defined diagnosis for classifying individuals who had been 




that it was considered a temporary diagnosis, which would later become a neurotic reaction if the 
symptoms persevered.  Gross-stress reaction was primarily combat-focused and included current 
characteristic of trauma induced stress. 
Surprisingly, the DSM-II deleted gross stress reaction, leaving clinicians without options 
for diagnosing individuals who had catastrophic experiences. The deletion of gross-stress 
reaction may have occurred because of the period of peace between WWII and the Vietnam War 
(Andreasen, 2010). By the time the third revisions to the DSM were occurring, the psychological 
repercussions of the Vietnam War were unfolding. In the 1970s, many clinicians recognized the 
need for a new diagnosis for patients suffering from severe and chronic symptoms preceded by 
exposure to traumatic events. From Gilgamesh to the First World War, more than 3000 years 
were necessary for medicine and science to establish a structured nosology of traumatic stress 
(Birmes et al., 2003). These events paved the way for the inclusion of PTSD in the DSM-III. 
The current conceptualization of PTSD first appeared in the DSM-III and encompassed a 
variety of traumatic stressors in addition to combat, including natural disasters, mass 
catastrophes, industrial accidents, and death camps (3rd ed.; DSM-III; APA, 1980). The main 
criteria for PTSD was re-experiencing the trauma, avoidance of things associated with the 
trauma, and increased arousal. The traumatic event criterion specified that the trauma must be so 
extreme that it would cause marked distress in anyone. The traumatic event criterion was 
expanded to include other traumas (APA, 1980). The most recent changes to the event criterion 
specify that simply witnessing a traumatic event happening to others or learning about a 
traumatic event happening to love ones is sufficient to cause posttraumatic symptoms (4th ed., 




include events that are recurrent traumatic experiences (e.g., first responders, emergency room 
staff). 
Recent conceptualizations of PTSD describe it as a psychological disorder that develops 
following the experience or witnessing of life-threatening, sexually violating, or seriously 
injurious events (APA, 2000). Learning that traumatic events happening to a loved one can also 
produce PTSD symptoms (Cantor, 2007).  Some of the most common events associated with 
PTSD included sexual assault, accident or fire, violent death of a family member or friend, and 
witnessing physical assault. In the general population, sexual assault is the most common 
traumatic event leading to PTSD symptoms (Kilpatrick et al., 2003). PTSD symptomatology 
includes involuntarily re-experiencing the event, avoiding event-related situations, negative 
moods and thought patterns, and hyperarousal (5th ed.; DSM-5; APA, 2013). In addition to these 
symptoms, some individuals experience dissociation from their environment, such as 
depersonalization or derealization of current surroundings. However, experiencing these types of 
trauma does not always lead to psychopathology and development of PTSD (Tedeschi & 
Calhoun 1995; Zoellner & Maercker, 2006). 
Conventional Theories of PTSD 
Traditional theories explaining PTSD development include cognitive, behavioral, and 
developmental perspectives. Recent technological advancements have provided new insight into 
the physiological underpinnings of trauma.  
Cognitive & Behavioral Theory 
A significant amount of the behavioral research on PTSD is focused on examining the 
impact of uncontrollable and unpredictable events on the development of pathology (Cantor, 




symptoms (Foa et al., 1989). For example, animals will display marked distress upon re-
exposure to trauma stimuli (Cantor, 2005). Non-primate mammals display an inverse 
relationship between an animal’s control over their environment and fear response (Mowrer & 
Viek, 1948). Rats exposed to inescapable shock showed deficits in escape-avoidance learning, 
which suggests that psychopathology is the product of instrumental learning and classical 
conditioning (Jackson, Alexander, & Maier, 1980).  
Exposing dogs to inescapable socks interfered with subsequent escape-avoidance 
responses in other situations (Overmier & Seligman, 1967; Seligman & Maier, 1967). When the 
dogs were released from their harness they behaved passively and failed to perform escape 
behavior, this phenomenon was called learned helplessness (Seligman, 1975). Controllability and 
predictability is central to learned helplessness (Cantor, 2005), and fundamental to understanding 
PTSD (Foa et al., 1992). An organism that has control over an event can predict when the event 
will end (Wortman & Brehm, 1975). While some predictable events cannot be controlled, signals 
preceding the event may allow the organism to prepare for the aversive event. Control and 
predictability over the termination of the event greatly reduces conditioning of fear responses 
(Mineka & Zinbarg, 1991).  
Cognitive schemas before, during, and after trauma encompass the basis of early 
cognitive perspectives of PTSD. Posttraumatic stress disorder is a violation of existing schemas 
and destroying belief systems. Trauma affects an individual’s schemas of self-worth, others’ 
trustworthiness, and worldview (McCann & Pearlman, 1990). Traumatic events that are strong 
enough to change fundamental belief systems will usually result in PTSD symptoms.   
According to Emotional Processing theory (Foa, Skeketee, & Rothbaum, 1989) 




habituation does not occur, this fosters the development of PTSD (Foa et al., 1989). Irrational 
fears and distorted beliefs about the traumatic event lead to avoidance of reminders, which is 
consistent with PTSD symptomatology.  
According to the behavioral-cognitive inhibition theory, PTSD is the product of 
dysfunctional memories based upon faulty appraisals of the trauma-centered memories 
(Paunovic, 2010). These faulty appraisals and memories affect current appraisals, memories, and 
functionality. Current behavioral responses and appraisals are learned from previous appraisals 
and responses surrounding traumatic events, which lead to impairments in functionality and 
quality of life.  
Development and Attachment Theories 
The earlier the trauma occurs developmentally; the more detrimental subsequent 
functioning is during childhood and into adulthood. From a developmental perspective, a child 
exposed to trauma would acquire a perception that the environment is untrustworthy and unsafe 
and they will expect to be betrayed, victimized, and feel unsafe generally (Cantor, 2005). These 
perceptions and expectations foster an inability for self-regulation, disorganized behavior and 
thought patterns, anger, and defiant behaviors (van der Kolk, 2005). This pattern of behavior 
among maltreated children is often understood in terms of attachment theory (Hornor, 2009).  
Attachment patterns formed during childhood provide the framework for which the 
individuals develop future relationships. Individuals exposed to trauma develop maladaptive 
attachments that continue into adulthood (Allen, Coyen, & Huntoon, 1998; Pearlman & Courtois, 
2005). Caregiving behaviors that are neglectful or violent can cause children to be hypervigilant 




anxious and avoidant relational behavioral responses. Trauma-exposed children display 
disorganized attachments, inability for self-regulation, and dissociative responses.  
Physiological Perspectives 
Physiological reactivity to exposure to cues similar to a traumatic event is a characteristic 
feature of PTSD (Sack, Hopper, & Lamprecht, 2004). Individuals with PTSD report the 
symptoms are beyond their capacity to regulate and control; the inability to regulate levels of 
arousal and distress is central to PTSD (Frewen & Lanius, 2006). Individuals exposed to severe 
trauma (i.e., childhood sexual abuse, recurrent domestic violence) may have their neural 
capacities for regulating arousal levels compromised. PTSD is a disorder of generalized 
emotional dysregulation (Sack, Hopper, & Lamprecht, 2004). The psychophysiological 
symptoms of PTSD include hyperarousal (e.g., excessive startle reflex, hypervigilance) and 
exaggerated reactions to trauma cues, which indicate a dysfunctional physiological stress system 
(Hauschildt, Peters, Moritz, & Jelinek, 2011).  
PTSD has been linked to impaired hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis functioning 
(Yehuda, 2003), impaired emotional regulation (Lanius, Bluhm, Lanius, & Pain, 2006), and 
altered gene expression (Yehuda & Bierer, 2007). These changes in physiological functioning 
produce effects on stress response, physical health, and the capacity to regulate to ongoing 
stressors from the environment. It is unknown the impact these dysfunctions have after PTSD 
symptoms are resolved. The neurobiological effects of severe stress can be long-lasting (Cotella, 
Mestres Lascano, Franchioni, Levin, & Suarez, 2013). People with PTSD may experience 
persistent alteration of fundamental physiological process that underpin stress response and this 




There is an association between PTSD and elevations in basal heart rate and diastolic 
blood pressure (Buckley & Kaloupek, 2001). Elevations of cardiac activity may reflect changes 
in the cardiovascular system in response from repeated cardiovascular stress (Fredrikson & 
Matthews, 1990). Individuals with PTSD exhibit exaggerated cardiovascular responses to trauma 
cues (Blanchard & Buckley, 1999). Cardiovascular responses to trauma cues are mediated by the 
autonomic nervous system, which produces elevated catecholamine levels after exposure to 
stressors (Blanchard, Kolb, Prins, Gates, & McCoy, 1991). 
PTSD populations have on average heart rate resting values approximately five beats per 
minute faster than control groups (Buckley & Kaloupek, 2001). Individuals with PTSD are more 
reactive to a variety of stressors, which could influence their baseline measures.   The 
mechanisms and processes by which the amygdala and other structures of the brain affect the 
heart have been well studied in humans with PTSD (Tomb, 1994; Buckley & Kaloupek, 2001; 
Blanchard et al., 1991; Sack et al., 2004). Higher resting heart rate and greater heart rate activity 
to trauma cues in individuals with PTSD have been explained as over activation of the ANS 
(Sack et al., 2004).  
Autonomic Arousal Systems 
Sympathetic nervous system (SNS) activation has been a prominent focus in the realm of 
psychophysiology (Domshke, Stevens, Pleiderer, & Gerlack, 2009). Physiological correlates of 
PTSD symptomatology are commonly studied through the ANS (Kemp, Felmingham, Falconer, 
Liddell, Bryant, & Williams, 2009). The regulatory features of the ANS contribute to the body’s 
ability to maintain homeostasis. Parasympathetic activity regulated by the ANS and the influence 
of the vagus nerve has been the topic of recent psychophysiological studies (Dale, Carroll, 




2012). The vagus nerve is the tenth of twelve cranial nerves that originate in the medulla 
oblongata, where various autonomic and visceral components of the brain reside. The vagus 
nerve extends from the pharyngeal and laryngeal branches, lungs, heart, and subthoracic renal 
and gastric organs. The vagus nerve plays a significant role in regulation of the ANS 
parasympathetic division (Porges, 2011).  
Increased understanding of the vagus influence and parasympathetic activation 
illuminates our understanding of trauma-related stress (Blechert, Michael, Grossman, Lajtman, & 
Wilhelm 2007; Lewis, Furman, McCool, & Porges, 2012). The influence the vagus nerve on the 
ANS is called vagal tone and is influenced by the parasympathetic branch of the ANS. Increased 
vagal tone is associated with an increased ability to deal with stress (Bornestein & Suess, 2000; 
Porges, Doussard-Roosevelt, Portales, & Greenspan, 1996; Stifter & Fox, 1990). Decreased 
vagal tone leads to a decreased ability to cope with stress (Porges, 2011). Therefore, vagal tone is 
a physiological marker of one’s ability to respond to environmental stressors and is a biomarker 













Chapter 2: The Polyvagal Theory 
The polyvagal theory - a theory describing differentiated vagal systems within mammals 
that represent phylogenetic adaptive reactions to challenge - describes how and why autonomic 
processes correspond to affective experiences (Porges, 2007; 2011). When these regulatory 
processes are dysfunctional, abnormal behavioral, and affective patterns follow. Impaired 
difficulties with self-regulation are characteristic of trauma-related psychopathology (Blechert, 
Michael, Grossman, Lajtman, & Wilhelm 2007; Lewis et al., 2012). Cognitive and behavioral 
responses reflect the dysregulatory patterns of trauma symptomatology. The polyvagal theory is 
a comprehensive explanation that fits other perspectives in explaining posttrauma experiences. 
The polyvagal theory provides methodological approaches and theoretical perspectives to study 
autonomic functioning and emotional regulation. This theory provides framework for 
understanding pathological deficits of PTSD and potentially PTG. Individuals with PTSD do not 
display vagal brake in a resting period after a viewing trauma specific stimuli (Sahar, Shalev, & 
Porges, 2001). To date, no studies have investigated the self-regulatory mechanisms of PTG and 
vagal brake response after viewing trauma specific stimuli.  
As put forth by Stephen Porges (2001; 2007), the polyvagal theory (PVT) proposes that 
the evolution of the mammalian ANS provides the neurophysiological mechanisms for the 
emotional processes of social behavior.  This theory links the evolution of the ANS to affective 
experience, emotional expression, facial expressions and head movements, vocalizations, and 
social behavior (Porges, 2011). The term polyvagal itself indicates that there are multiple vagal 
pathways, and so an understanding of the ANS, including afferent and efferent pathways, target 
organs, and the bidirectional communication between the central nervous system (CNS) and the 




PVT proposes three distinct phylogenetic subsystems of development of the ANS. The 
three autonomic subsystems are social communication (i.e., the Social Engagement System), 
mobilization (e.g., fight-flight), and immobilization (e.g., feigning death, vasovagal response, 
and behavioral shutdown; Porges, 1995). The social communication system relies on the 
myelinated vagus, which calms behavioral and physiological states by inhibiting sympathetic 
influences to the heart and suppressing the HPA axis (Porges, 2011). The mobilization system 
relies on the functioning of the SNS, which removes the vagal brake and allows for fight-flight 
behaviors (Porges, 2007). The immobilization system is dependent on the unmyelinated vagus, 
which regulates heart rate deceleration and freezing behavior. The three subsystems provide 
adaptive physiological and behavioral responses to various types of environments and stimuli, 
from safe and relaxed to dangerous, stressful, or life-threatening events. 
The PVT rests on the five following premises regarding the anatomy and physiology of 
the vagus in mammals (Porges, 2011). First, the vagus is family of neural pathways originating 
in several areas of the brain stem. Second, there are several branches of the vagus. Third, the 
vagus is not only an efferent pathway; indeed, some 80% of the vagal fibers are afferent 
(Agostoni, Chinnock, DeBurgh Daly, & Murray, 1957). Fourth, the vagus is lateralized, with 
nerve trunks originating in the left and right sides of the brainstem. Fifth, the vagus is 
asymmetrical, with the different sides performing distinct tasks, such as the right vagus being 
involved in regulation of the heart. The origin in different areas of the brainstem mean that the 
different vagal members that make up the vagus play unique roles in the regulation of visceral 





For example, in mammals there are two functionally distinct vagal motor systems: the left 
pathway originating in the dorsal motor nucleus of the vagus (DMNX) and the right pathway 
originating in the nucleus ambiguous (NA). Both pathways, in turn, innervate the sinoatrial node 
(SA), which is the primary cardiac pacemaker. The NA influence on the SA is referred to as 
vagal tone (Park et al., 2012) and is seen across many types of animals, the NA pathway is 
unique to mammalian orienting response (Porges, 2011). Vagal tone is removed/decreased to 
support mobilization (e.g., fight-flight behaviors) and maintained/increased to support social 
engagement behaviors. Vagal tone is related to behavioral and psychological processes along a 
continuum from prosocial interactions to fight-flight behaviors. 
During mammalian, orienting responses there is an increase in vagal outflow from the 
DMNX area that produces heart rate deceleration (e.g., causing neurogenic bradycardia) while 
the nucleus ambiguous suppresses Respiratory Sinus Arrhythmia (RSA; Porges, 1995b). RSA is 
a naturally occurring variation in heart rate that occurs during inhalation and expiration of the 
breathing cycle (Porges, 2007). The time between heartbeats is shortened during inhalation and 
lengthened during expiration. RSA is an accurate measurement of the influence of the 
myelinated vagal efferent pathways on the sinoatrial node, and as such provides a noninvasive 
indirect measurement of the vagal tone, which is the influence of the myelinated vagus on the 
heart (Porges, 1995b).  
RSA is an accurate measurement of the influence of the myelinated vagal efferent 
pathways on the sinoatrial node, and as such provides a measurement of the vagal tone. Reliable 
suppression of RSA is an index of positive social and emotional regulation, while low levels and 
unreliable RSA regulation indicates poor social and emotional regulation, and in some cases, has 




behavioral problems have lower RSA and suppressed RSA during empirical tests, while children 
with reliable and stable RSA suppression displayed fewer behavioral problems, decreased 
negative affectivity, and better social skills (Blair & Peters, 2003). High RSA appears to buffer 
children from the effects of marital hostility (Gottman, Jacobson, Rushe, & Shortt, 1995) and 
predicts greater self-control and decreased negative emotional arousal in adults (Fabes & 
Eisenberg, 1997). Poor RSA regulation in adults has also been associated with greater social 
anxiety and lower RSA is associated with more defensiveness (Movius & Allen, 2005). 
Individuals with clinical levels of anxiety exhibit lower and less suppression of RSA (Friedman 
& Thayer, 1998). Importantly, RSA parallels positive effects of treatment, with increases in RSA 
following treatment for depression (Rottenberg, Gross, & Gotlib, 2005). Outside of mental 
health, physical factors including cardiovascular risk (Hayano et al., 1990), diabetes, and obesity 
are related to low RSA (Quilliot et al., 2001).   
Psychological Threat Detection  
How does the nervous system know when the environment is safe or dangerous and what 
neural mechanisms evaluate risk? To efficiently switch from social engagement to defensive 
strategies the nervous system needs to perform two important tasks: a) assess risk to determine if 
the environment is safe; and b) to suppress the limbic system that regulates fight-flight or freeze 
behaviors (Porges, 2007, 2011). The nervous system, through continual processing of 
information from the environment, evaluates risk. The neural process of evaluating risk does not 
require conscious awareness and involves subcortical limbic structures (Morris et al., 1998). 
Such neuroception is the capability of distinguishing environmental features that are life 




When an organism perceives the environment to be safe, the bodily state is regulated to 
promote growth and restoration (Porges, 1995; 2011). This process occurs through the influence 
of the myelinated vagal pathways on the cardiac pacemaker that inhibits fight-flight responses, 
and suppresses stress response system of the HPA-axis (Porges, 2007). The brainstem nuclei that 
regulate the myelinated vagus are linked to the nuclei that regulate the muscles of the face and 
the head. This link produces a bidirectional communication system between bodily states and 
social engagement behaviors. 
Neuroception also involves detectors in the temporal cortex, these structures respond to 
voice, hand, and face movements and influence limbic reactivity (Porges, 2007). The nervous 
system evaluates risk and matches physiological states with the actual risk of the environment. 
When the environment is perceived as safe, the defensive limbic structures are suppressed 
enabling social engagement and calm states (Porges, 1995). However, some individuals perceive 
the environment as dangerous when it is safe. This mismatch produces physiological states that 
support fight-flight or freeze behaviors, rather than social engagement behaviors, in safe 
environments. The SES allows for social communication only when the defensive circuits are 
inhibited (Porges, 2011). Neuroception is the neural process that allows for mammals to engage 
in social behaviors and mediates the expression affect regulation and homeostasis.   
The three physiological and behavioral subsystems – immobilization, mobilization, and 
the Social Engagement System - respond to stress in a determined hierarchy consistent with the 
Jacksonian principle of dissolution (Porges, 2007). Jackson proposed that newer neural circuits 
inhibited older neural circuits and when higher circuits are unsuccessful, the older circuits take 
over (Jackson, 1884). Through the hierarchy of adaptive responses, the newest circuits are used 




polyvagal system, the subsystems from oldest to newest are immobilization, mobilization, and 
the Social Engagement System (Porges, 2011). 
The Social Engagement System, PTSD, and Posttraumatic Growth 
The phylogenetic origin of the social engagement system is associated with the ANS 
(Porges, 2011). As the muscles involved in head movement and the muscles of the face 
intertwined into social engagement structures, a new component of the ANS regulated by the NA 
through the myelinated vagus evolved (Porges, 2007). The Social Engagement System (SES) 
controls upper motor neurons of the cortex, regulates lower motor neurons in the brainstem 
nuclei that control facial muscle for emotional expression, eyelid opening for looking, middle ear 
muscles for extracting human voices, muscles for mastication for ingestion, muscles of the 
larynx and pharynx for intonation, and head turning muscles for social gesture and orientation 
(Porges, 2011). 
The vertebrate ANS follows three stages of development, with each stage having various 
adaptive functions (Porges, 2011). As a reminder, those stages are immobilization, mobilization, 
and the Social Engagement System. The neural circuitry in each stage supports different 
behavior, with the phylogenetically newer myelinated vagus capable of supporting social 
engagement behavior (Porges, 2011). When the SES is compromised, this causes a change in 
autonomic regulation that is characterized by reduced influence of the myelinated vagus on the 
heart. The removal of the vagal brake then allows for the expression of the two phylogenetically 
older neural systems. These two older systems allow for mobilization behaviors of fight-flight 
through the sympathetic nervous system, or immobilization behaviors of breezing, death 




Autonomic functioning as a feature of PTSD has been examined through heart activity, 
skin conductance, and breathing patterns (Cantor, 2005). Sympathetic ANS activation is 
evidence in decreased heart-rate variability, increased skin conductance, and attenuated 
respiration (Porges, 2007). A healthy functioning ANS system regulates physiological arousal 
through an opponent-process method involved the sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous 
systems. The sympathetic nervous system arouses the body by increasing heart rate, attenuating 
respiration, and producing perspiration (Kreibig, 2010). The sympathetic activation is often 
called the fight-flight response. The parasympathetic nervous system counterbalances the 
processes of the sympathetic system by suppressing excitatory functions and returning the body 
to homeostasis. Diagnostic features of PTSD rely on sympathetic activation or hyperarousal. The 
literature on PTSD has focused specifically on sympathetic activation (Fani et al., 2012; Orr & 
Roth, 2000; McTeague, Lange, Laplante, Cuthbert, Shumen, & Bradley, 2010). 
Under current diagnostic criteria for PTSD, a person must be experiencing hyperarousal 
after experience a traumatic event (APA, 2013). Irritability, angry outbursts, hypervigilance, 
exaggerated startle response, and difficulty concentrating characterize hyperarousal. Prolonged 
sympathetic activation and a lack of parasympathetic activation can translate to autonomic 
dysregulation, which is a common feature observed in PTSD populations (Tan, Dao, Farmer, 
Sutherland, & Gevirtz, 2010). The role of cardiac activity in the ANS has been extensively 
studied in trauma research (Porges, 2007). Abnormalities in heart rate (HR) to trauma related 
stimuli has been exhibited in a plethora of PTSD samples (Hauschidlt et al., 2011; Sack, Hopper, 
Lamprecht, 2004; Pole, 1994). Individuals with PTSD exhibit elevated tonic cardiovascular 
activity (Buckley & Kaloupek, 2001; Pole, 2007) and excessive HR reactivity to trauma 




with a reduced basal HR (hypoarousal) or even dissociation when confronted with trauma cues 
(Lanius et al., 2006). Individuals with PTSD compared to trauma-exposed individuals without 
PTSD exhibited amplified heart rate, attenuated respiration, and decreased heart rate variability 
or RSA (Sack et al., 2004). These differences are exaggerated when individuals are exposed to 
trauma-specific stimuli. Individuals with PTSD tend to remain physiologically aroused and fail 
to return to baseline levels (Norte et al., 2012). Therefore, it is evident that individuals with 
PTSD have a unique physiological response to trauma-specific stimuli; this physiological 
response may illuminate our understanding of posttraumatic growth and how individuals with 

















Chapter 3: Posttraumatic Growth 
Some trauma survivors may experience positive psychological changes after a traumatic 
event (Tedeschi & Calhoun 1995; Zoellner & Maercker, 2006). Posttraumatic growth (PTG) is 
defined as the subjective experience of positive psychological change after traumatic 
experiences. PTG is a meaning-making process where trauma-exposed individuals make sense of 
the trauma. This process of coping and finding meaning then produces genuine and long-lasting 
positive change (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004). People often report positive outcomes following 
traumatic or stressful situations, either as a direct result of the event or a product of learning that 
occurred through their effort to cope with the event (Park, 1998). PTG describes the experience 
of individuals who not only recover from the trauma by returning to their baseline of functioning, 
but also because of the trauma develop and benefit from the experience. The beneficial outcomes 
include increased appreciation of life, improved closeness of intimate relationships, positive 
spiritual change, setting new priorities, or a sense of increased personal strength (Tedeschi, Park, 
& Calhoun, 1998). Surprisingly, individuals who have been through two horrific events 
experience more growth than individuals who have one, and individuals who have three horrific 
events are stronger than those with only two (Seligman, 2012). This was reflected in a study of 
imprisoned airmen, where 61% of them reported benefiting psychologically from their 
imprisonment. The more severe their torture, the greater their reported PTG was (Sledge, 
Boydstun & Rabe, 1980).  
PTG may even be present at a community level, in some interpretations of the research. 
For example, after mass traumas there is an outpouring of emotional and material support to help 
survivors cope with disasters (Solnit, 2009). Post-disaster communities are characterized by a 
high degree of unity, an increase in prosocial behaviors, and a reduction in intergroup conflicts 




depression and anxiety post-trauma due to increased perceived social support, gains in social 
resources, and altruistic behavior of others due to the traumatic event (Vollhardt, 2009). After 
mass trauma, communities unite, grievances are forgiven, and feelings of unity and common 
purpose increase, all of which promote wellbeing (Mancini, Littleton, & Grills, 2016). The pain 
of mass trauma can disrupt preexisting distress by providing a sense of relief from current 
stressors.  
Theories of Posttraumatic Growth 
There are several different explanations of why and how people experience PTG. One 
model of PTG proposes that it is the product of attempts to cope with stressful and traumatic 
experiences. Stressful events are not always negative but can allow for personal development 
(Aldwin, Levenson, & Spiro, 1994). Different coping strategies result in different outcomes after 
a traumatic event. In this model, homeostatic coping leads individuals back to their pretrauma 
baseline levels of functioning; transformational negative coping leads to lower psychological 
functioning and wellbeing; and transformational positive coping leads to higher levels of 
psychological coping. As such, PTG occurs when an individual undergoes transformational 
positive coping after a traumatic event. 
According to Shaefer and Moos’ (1992) model of life crises, factors of personal growth, 
environmental, and personal differences influence the life of the individual post-trauma. The 
environmental factors include support from family, friends and social environment, personal 
relationships, and financial resources. The interpersonal factors include differences in resilience, 
optimism, self-confidence, self-efficacy, motivation, health status, and previous experience with 
trauma (Zoellner & Maercker, 2006).  These factors affect coping responses and cognitive 




by feedback loops. Shaefer and Moos (1992) propose that for growth to occur an individual will 
need to use active coping approaches and have the right environmental and personal factors. 
Per Tedeschi and Calhoun (2004), PTG occurs after a traumatic event of catastrophic 
proportions destroys fundamental elements of a person’s goals and worldview. The traumatic 
event causes significant challenges to beliefs, goals, and the ability to regulate and manage 
emotional distress. The emotional distress causes a pattern of recurrent rumination and attempt to 
engage in behavior to reduce the emotional distress. The rumination results in actively thinking 
about the trauma and subsequent issues. Eventually the rumination evolves into more deliberate 
thinking about the trauma and how it changes one’s life. Rumination becomes a constructive 
process and plays a vital role in the development of growth. It is through this process that PTG 
occurs and produces changes in one’s beliefs, goals, behaviors, and identity. 
In summary, these models of PTG (Shaefer & Moos, 1992; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004) 
propose that PTG is predicted by a person’s pre-trauma characteristics, schemas, goals and 
beliefs as well as by factors of rumination, schema changes, and enduring stress. Unfortunately, 
these proposed models are difficult to test empirically due to the vague definitions of many of the 
predictors, except for enduring stress. 
Some theorists have explained PTG as an individual's attempt to construe meaning from 
the traumatic experience (Davis, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Larson, 1998). This model is based on the 
idea that people believe that events in their lives are controllable, comprehensible, and 
nonrandom. In response to trauma individuals will attempt to engage in the adaptive and 
important task of making meaning of the event (Davis et al., 1998). PTG is one of the two 
possible results of making meaning of the event. For PTG to occur individuals must engage in an 




exposed individual can answer the question “What for?” after the trauma and find a subjective 
perception of personal growth, then PTG will occur. 
Park and Folkman (1997) differentiate between situational and global meaning in the 
context of stress and coping. Global meaning includes a person’s beliefs and goals. Situational 
meaning is the interaction between a person’s global meaning and their interaction with the 
environment. A traumatic event damages their global meaning, thus starting the meaning-making 
process. Through the coping process the individual must integrate situational meaning and their 
understanding of the trauma with their global meaning. PTG will occur when the individual 
creates meaning for the event (Zoellner & Maercker, 2006). For example, finding beneficial 
outcomes from the trauma would fall into the category of assimilation. In contrast, an individual 
could completely change their philosophy of life because of the trauma, which would cause 
changes in their global meaning. 
Some theorists have attempted to explain the development of PTG through the 
perspective of differences in explanatory styles. Explanatory style is defined as habitual ways of 
explaining the causes of events and the pattern of explanations (Peterson & Vaidya, 1995; Ho, 
Chan, Yau, & Yeung, 2011). An optimistic explanatory style of negative events is the tendency 
to explain the events, as having external, unstable, and specific causes. A pessimistic explanatory 
style for negative events is the habit of explaining negative events as internal, stable, and global. 
The explanatory style an individual espouses affects how one attributes the causes of events, 
which affects subsequent cognitive processing. Individuals with optimistic explanatory styles 
will report less posttraumatic stress symptoms and more perceived positive changes after a 
traumatic event (Ho et al., 2011). Individuals with a pessimistic explanatory style for negative 




& Hayes, 1995). Pessimistic explanatory styles predict the development of PTSD after traumatic 
events (Joseph, Yule, & Wiliams, 1993). Explanatory style for good events, but not for bad 
events, is associated with PTG (Ho et al., 2011). Optimistic explanatory styles for good events 
enables the individual to obtain understanding of self-reaction in a trauma leading to higher self-
perceived growth (Gohm & Clore, 2002). Interestingly, explanatory style for bad events does not 
predict self-perceived PTG, but does predict psychological distress associated with PTSD, 
depression, and anxiety (Ho et al., 2011). This would suggest that after a traumatic event an 
individual’s explanatory style would not influence their development of PTG, but could for 
PTSD. 
The relationship between PTG and posttrauma adjustment is more evident over time 
(Shakespeare-Finish & Lurie-Beck, 2014). A study conducted with people from Israel showed 
that PTG is associated with posttraumatic stress at 6 and 12 months, with higher levels of 
posttraumatic stress symptoms correlated with higher levels of PTG at both time periods (Hall, 
Saltzman, Cenetti, & Hobfoll, 2015). These results are consistent with the theory that PTG is the 
product of the struggle with trauma and distress, per Tedeschi and Calhoun’s theory (2004). A 
recent meta-analysis also revealed an overall positive relationship between PTSD and PTG 
(Shakespeare-Finsh & Lurie-Beck, 2014). One longitudinal study with prisoners of war found 
that PTSD predicted PTG over 12 years later (Erbes et al, 2005). There is an interesting 
interaction effect with time and trauma severity that act as a moderator effect of PTG on 
psychological adjustment (Zoellner & Maercker, 2006).   
PTG as a coping strategy denotes a significant beneficial change in emotional, 
psychological, and cognitive life that is completely different from PTSD. According to this 




dimensions, so these constructs are not regarded as two ends of the same continuum of 
adaptation to trauma (Zoellner & Maercker, 2006). PTG is also not regarded as the same thing as 
a decrease in distress or an increase in wellbeing (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004). In this way, PTG 
can reportedly coexist with emotional distress for some people. 
PTG has also been conceptualized as a positive illusion (Zoellner & Maercker, 2006) 
with an adaptive function for psychological functioning. The perception of PTG helps 
individuals cope with the trauma through self-enhancing appraisals (Taylor & Armor, 1996). 
But, positive relationships between PTG and psychological wellbeing are usually only found in 
studies with nonstandarized assessments of PTG, thus producing low reliability and validity 
(Zoellner & Maercker, 2006). The studies that used validated instruments of PTG usually do not 
find any relationship between PTG and psychological wellbeing.  
As can be seen from this brief review, PTG has been difficult to study. There are several 
reasons why, with the first being that to document growth, researchers must assess exposed 
persons before the stressor or trauma occurs. Such pre-event assessments are rare in trauma 
research and most of the research conducted is based on data obtained after the traumatic event 
has happened. This is problematic for several reasons. In the absence of pre-traumatic 
assessments, it is impossible to determine the precise impact the trauma has on people’s 
functioning. A second key problem is that a clear majority of previous research has examined the 
average response to acute stress, and, on average people will experience an increase in distress 
following a traumatic event (Bonanno et al., 2010). Thus, the possibility of improvement or of 
other responses will be necessarily be obscured in studies that examine average longitudinal 





Controversy Surrounding Posttraumatic Growth 
There is significant controversy regarding the significance of PTG for recovery after 
trauma and the relationship with posttraumatic stress (Linley & Joseph, 2004; Zoellner & 
Maercker, 2006). Different theorists have proposed diverse models of PTG, with it 
conceptualized either as an outcome from the traumatic event (Shaefer & Moos, 1992, 1998; 
Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1995, 2004) or a coping strategy (Affleck & Tennen 1996). Further, there 
is speculation if PTG is genuine positive change or a maladaptive self-deceptive coping 
mechanism that prevents healing from occurring (Frazier et al., 2009; Hall, Hobfoll, Canetti, 
Johnson, & Galea, 2009). 
The first controversy concerns whether reported “growth” following trauma represents 
actual growth (Tedeschi, Park, & Calhoun, 1998), a motivated positive illusion (Taylor, 1983), 
or a coping process (McMillen & Cook, 2003). Evidence of a significant growth consists of 
numerous reports of growth from survivors of traumatic events (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1995). 
Individuals who report growth after a traumatic event are comparing their current state to the 
state after the event, which appears to be growth, but could be a return to baseline levels of 
functioning (McFarland & Alvaro, 2000). Individuals who have recently lost a loved one and are 
primed to think about their loss report more meaning in life than those who are not primed in 
such a way (Davis & McKearney, 2003). This would suggest growth following traumatic event 
is a self-protective strategy for coping with the event. The evidence suggests growth after 
adversity reflects something other than actual changes in life appreciation, priorities, or 
relationships with other people.  
The second controversy surrounds how the construct of PTG is measured and the validity 




after a traumatic event if they perceive they have grown because of the event. Typically, 
however, self-report questionnaires of personal change are viewed with caution and skepticism 
for several reasons (Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 2004). For one, perceived changes in personal 
attributes are weak predictors of actual change or growth (Robins, Noftle, Trzesniewski, & 
Roberts, 2005). Self-perceived changes in personality can be misperceptions, and such 
misperceptions have been documented over as little as three-month periods of time (Costa & 
McCrae, 1989; Wilson & Ross, 2000). Studies of relationship growth demonstrate that for 
couples who report growth in their relationships – just as participants in studies of PTG report 
growth – prospective ratings reveal no increases and even show declines in relationship strength 
and quality (Karney & Coombs, 2000; Kirkpatrick & Hazan, 1994). 
 Another concern is that perceived growth is associated with increased distress, whereas 
actual growth was associated with decreased distress (Zoellner & Maercker, 2006; Frazier et al., 
2009). Perceived PTG as measured by the Posttraumatic Growth Inventory (PTGI) does not 
appear to measure actual growth from pre- to post-trauma. PTGI scores were unrelated to most 
measures of actual growth in positive relationships, meaning in life, gratitude, and life 
satisfaction (Frazier et al., 2009). Perceived growth was associated with positive reinterpretation 
coping, which suggests that the PGI measures something different from actual growth. This is 
problematic because the PTGI is the standardized measurement set forth by APA to measure 
PTG.  
Several studies have also found significant negative relationships between PTG and 
psychological wellbeing and adjustment and significant positive relationships between PTG and 
psychological distress (Zoellner & Maercker, 2006). It appears that PTG could be a maladaptive 




correlation between PTG and distress point to maladaptive cognitive processes involved in self-
perceived PTG. Posttraumatic growth may be an unfavorable psychological mechanism and 
prevents real healing from occurring. PTG and PTSD may operate in a loop, providing positive 
feedback in which they mutually promote each other, delaying the recovery of those exposed to 
trauma. In support of that idea, one study found no significant relationship between 
posttraumatic stress at 5 months and PTG 15 months after deployment (Englehard, Lommen, & 
Sijbrandij, 2014). But, higher levels of self-reported PTG were associated with higher levels of 
posttraumatic stress 15 months after deployment. This is in line with the idea that PTG is a 
maladaptive coping mechanism that is negatively associated with mental health (Zoellner, & 
Maercker, 2006), in direct opposition to the position adopted by people who think it is positive. 
In other words, early reported PTG was related to later development of posttraumatic stress 
symptoms and suggest that perceived growth contributes to the development of PTSD 
symptoms. Initial growth predicted development of PTSD symptoms in deployed soldiers 
(Engelhard et al, 2010). After the Oslo bombing in 2001, researchers investigated the 
longitudinal relationship between PTG and PTSD and found conflicting reciprocal effects 
between PTG and trauma (Blix, Birkeland, Hansen, & Heir, 2016).  
The timing at which individuals are asked about their perceived growth after the 
traumatic events could be fundamental to understanding the bidirectional relationship between 
PTG and PTSD. Researchers have found that while PTG measured at 10 months was related to 
subsequent levels of posttraumatic stress, PTG measured at 22 months was not associated with 
posttraumatic stress (Mancini et al., 2016). This was explained by the fact that PTG measured at 




developing PTSD, but the PTG measure at 22 months might reflect a more constructive and 
genuine growth post-trauma. 
Similarly, the longitudinal research about the relationship between PTG and PTSD is 
conflicted. Some of the research reports a negative longitudinal relationship where early PTG 
predicted lower levels of PTSD symptoms (Linley, Joseph, & Goodfellow, 2008). Other studies 
have failed to find a relationship between PTG and PTSD (Phelps, Williams, Raichle, Turner, & 
Ehde, 2008; Salsman, Segerstrom, Brechting, Carlson, & Andrykowski, 2009). One study 
examined if posttraumatic stress symptoms predicted subsequent development of PTG, finding 
that higher levels of posttraumatic stress predicted higher levels of PTG (Lowe, Manove, & 
Rhodes, 2013).  It is apparent there is a need for further research about the course and 
bidirectional nature of the relationship between PTSD and PTG. 
The components and predictive ability of PTG are ambiguous and unclear. The question 
of what PTG is, if not an adaptive physiological phenomenon, is an interesting one with many 
implications. One way to examine PTG would be to examine the association between levels of 
distress, wellbeing, other areas of mental health, and self-regulation.  There are many 
inconsistencies in the literatures and it is unclear what the PTGI measures. There appears to be a 
large illusory component to PTG and few studies have incorporated methodology that goes 
beyond self-report. By obtaining a better understanding of how PTSD and PTG are related we 
can tease apart the unique and dynamic relationship between these two constructs. Through an 
understanding of the physiological mechanisms behind PTSD the true nature of PTG may 
become clear.  
The Polyvagal Theory may provide answers to some of these elusive questions and how 




specific stimuli should expect their RSA to parallel shifts in affective states elicited by the 
stimuli. Elicitation of a negative primary emotion would result in withdrawal of vagal tone along 
to promote fight-or-flight behaviors. A shift in more pleasant affective states would be associated 
with an increase in RSA. Theoretically, individuals with PTG should display increased RSA 
compared to healthy controls and PTSD after withdrawal of vagal tone. However, it is expected 




















Chapter 4: Current Study 
This study investigated the self-regulatory characteristics of PTG compared to healthy 
controls and PTSD by examining vagal tone through RSA. This study was the first to examine 
physiological underpinnings of PTG, as there is no published literature on this topic. Moreover, 
these physiological indices have direct links to the etiology and developmental course of the 
construct, in addition to corroborating the symptomology of PTSD and examining if there was 
physiological evidence for PTG.  
  Observations of RSA would hypothetically reveal differences between PTG, PTSD, and 
healthy control groups. RSA indicates the level of cardiac vagal tone from the brainstem NA 
(i.e., the vagal brake), which was expected to be very low or absent during unpleasant images in 
all groups. However, during the distraction task following unpleasant images, the control and 
PTG group’s vagal brake should reengage in the post-stress resting period; whereas, vagal brake 
in the PTSD group was expected to remain unengaged. Furthermore, the PTG group and healthy 
control should demonstrate greater vagal regulation than the PTSD group across all measurement 
phases.  
Hypotheses 
 Low RSA was associated with sympathetic activation, which is observed via shorter heart 
periods (Austin et al., 2007). These effects would be more pronounced in the PTSD group, than 
in the PTG and control groups.  
H1 = A main effect of group (PTG, PTSD, control) across physiological measures was 
expected, such that downward trends in RSA and shorter heart periods would be more 
pronounced in the PTSD group. Furthermore, it was expected that there would be no statistical 




A high correlation between RSA-change and heart-period-change would hypothetically 
reveal differences in cardiac vagal oscillations between PTG, PTSD, and control populations. 
This physiological measurement indicates the level of cardiac vagal tone from the NA (i.e., the 
vagal brake), which was expected to be absent after viewing aversive images in the PTSD group. 
During resting period, individuals with PTSD were expected to exhibit more vagal influence than 
those in the PTG group and the control group. Furthermore, the PTG group was not expected to 
differ from the control group and that both groups would return to baseline levels of RSA and 
heart-period.   
H2 = There would be a lower correlation between RSA-change and heart-period-change 
in the PTSD group verses the PTG and control groups.  
There has been a lot of speculation surrounding the Posttraumatic Growth Inventory 
(PTGI) and if it measures actual growth after traumatic events (Frazier et al., 2009). However, no 
studies to date have examined if scores on the PTGI are associated with measures of 
physiological wellbeing. Theoretically, individuals who score highly on the PTGI inventory, 
indicating growth posttrauma, would also exhibit high RSA and return to baseline after viewing 
aversive measures. However, it was expected that individuals in the PTG group and the control 
group would not be statistically different on RSA change and heart period.  
H3 = Individuals in the PTG group would exhibit upward trends in RSA and heart period 
and will be more pronounced than the PTSD group, but not statistically different than the healthy 








Participants and Procedure 
Students participated in research to earn credit toward their introductory psychology 
course. Participant’s self-reported demographic and diagnostic screening measures via Qualtrics, 
an online survey system. The PTSD sample was selected to participate in the laboratory protocol 
if they met or exceeded clinical cut-off scores on the PTSD-Checklist. The PTG sample was 
selected to participate if they exceeded cut-off scores on the Posttraumatic Growth Inventory 
(PGTI). The control sample was selected to participate if they were below clinical cut-off scores 
on all mental health assessments. Research participants were selected from the university subject 
pool via SONA-Systems, an online research participation recruitment site. 
Participants refrained from alcohol, drug use, and caffeinated beverages for four hours 
before attending the study. Participants who self-reported steroid use, narcotics, and medical 
illness within three weeks of the study, previous exposure to the photographs used in the study, 
and frequent exposure to violent computer game or movies were excluded from the study. All 
participants were 18 years or older and fluent in English. 
Table 1           
Socio-demographic and clinical characteristics for each group     
      Control (n = 8)   PTG (n = 8)   PTSD (n = 7) 
Age   M(SD)=18.73(.65)  M(SD)=21.4(1.95)  M(SD)=26.4(12.1)   
   Range: 18-28  Range=18-23  Range=18-29   
          
Gender          
 Female  n = 8  n = 8  n = 7   
 Male   n = 0  n = 0  n = 0   
          
Ethnicity           
White/Caucasian   n = 6  n = 6  n = 6   
African American  n = 1  n = 1  n = 1   
Asian   n = 0  n = 0  n = 0   
Pacific Islander  n = 0  n = 0  n = 0   




Hispanic/Latino   n = 0  n = 0  n = 0   
2 or more ethnicities  n = 0  n = 1  n = 0   
          
Education Level         
         
High school   n = 2  n = 1  n = 2   
Some College  n = 5  n = 5  n = 2   
Two-Year Degree  n = 1  n = 2  n = 3   
Four-Year Degree  n = 0  n = 0  n = 0   
Some Graduate Work  n = 0  n = 0  n = 0   
Master's Degree  n = 0  n = 0  n = 0   
Doctorate    n = 0  n = 0  n = 0   
          
Household Income         
Less than $15k  n = 1  n = 2  n = 3   
$15-30k   n = 3  n = 1  n = 1   
More than $30k  n = 4  n = 5  n = 3   
          
PTSD Checklist, DSM-IV-
TR M(SD)=26.2(5.7)  M(SD)=35.75(10.2)  M(SD)=62.75(9.1) 
 
 
     Scale Range: 17-85  Range: 17-34  Range: 21-47  Range: 54-76   
          
          
PTGI  M(SD)=51.4(13.2)  M(SD)=75.5(4.5)  M(SD)=54.2(8.4)   
     Scale Range: 0-84  (n = 8)   (n = 8)   (n = 7)    
          
Psychotropic Meds         
antidepressant  n = 0  n = 2  n = 5   
antianxiety   n = 0  n = 0  n = 2   
stimulants   n = 0  n = 1  n = 1   
sleepmeds   n = 0  n = 1  n = 3   
betablocker   n = 0  n = 0  n = 0   
antiseizure   n = 0  n = 1  n = 0   
Over-the-




Psychotropics  n = 0  n = 1  n = 1 
 
 
          
Smoking (< half pack a day)  n = 2  n = 2  n = 1   
Marijuana  n = 1  n = 0  n = 1   






Physiological Measures. Participants were attached to the ECG amplifier (BIOPAC 
Systems, Inc., Santa Barbara, CA) using three AG-AgCl electrodes with an 11-mm diameter 
contact area attached below the clavicles and on the abdomen on the lower left rib. Physiological 
measurements were recorded throughout the experimental procedure. For the first ten minutes of 
the study, participants sat quietly while baseline physiological arousal was measured and 
completed a distraction task. After baseline data was recorded, participants viewed 120 images 
from the International Affective Pictures System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) on a 
desktop computer while ECG data is collected. The photographs were in blocks composed of 60 
aversive and 60 pleasant images. Images were selected per the standardized rating set forth by 
creators of the IAPS (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008). Participants viewed each photograph for 
5 seconds. Participants viewed all blocks of images during the experimental procedure in a 
counterbalanced order. Between each block participants completed a distraction task while 
physiological data was recorded for five minutes. Following ECG data collection participants 
were disconnected from the BIOPAC and debriefed on the purpose of the study and thanked for 
their participation. The experimental protocol lasted approximately an hour. If the participant 
was still autonomically aroused the researcher conducted deep breathing exercises with them 
before they left the laboratory.  
Instrumentation  
Demographic Information.  Participants began the screening assessment by answering 
questions regarding their biological sex, gender affiliation, race, age, socioeconomic status, and 
previous or current military affiliation. (If participants answered “yes” to military affiliation, they 
were asked to provide military branch, primary duties, and number of deployments). Questions 




(being used currently) were addressed. All participants were 18 years old or older and spoke 
English. 
Posttraumatic Growth.  The Posttraumatic Growth Inventory (PTGI), Tedeschi & 
Calhoun, 1996) is a 21-item scales that assesses the following constructs: new possibilities (α = 
.84), relating to others (α = .85), personal strength (α = .72), spiritual change (α = .85), and 
appreciation for life (α = .67). The scale has some utility in determining how successful 
individuals will be able to cope with the aftermath of trauma by strengthening their perceptions 
of self and the meaning of events. Cronbach’s α coefficients, ranging from .67 to .89, indicate 
high internal consistency for the five subscales (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996). Scores range from 
17 to 85, with a clinical cut-off score of 60 and above. 
PTSD Assessments. Given the recent change in DSM-5 PTSD criteria, both assessments 
for DSM-IV-TR and DSM-5 symptom sets were included.  
DSM-IV-TR PTSD Checklist. Participants completed the PTSD Checklist for Civilians 
(PCL-C), a self-report diagnostic screening measure assessing the level to which an individual 
meets DSM-IV-TR criteria for PTSD (Norris & Hamblen, 2003). Twenty items assess three 
primary symptoms clusters: Criterion B or re-experiencing the traumatic event (e.g., “Repeated, 
disturbing memories, thoughts, or images of a stressful experience from the past?”), Criterion C 
or avoidance of reminders and numbing of responsiveness (e.g., “Avoid activities or situations 
because they remind you of a stressful experience from the past?” and “Feeling emotionally 
numb or being unable to have loving feelings for those close to you?”) and Criterion D or 
increased arousal (e.g., “Feeling jumpy or easily startled?”). Participants rate how much each 
item has bothered them during the last month on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) 




on at least one Criterion B item, three Criterion C items, and two Criterion D items (APA, 2000). 
A total symptom severity score is obtained by summing all 17 items together. Cronbach’s α 
coefficients, ranging from .73 to .85, indicate high internal consistency for the three symptom 
clusters (Weathers, Litz, Herman, Huska, & Keane, 1994). Scores range from 17 to 85, with a 
clinical cut-off score of 30 and above, in addition to meeting symptom pattern requirements 
outlined, to determine diagnostic significance.  
DSM-5 PTSD Checklist. This assessment is not differentiated between civilian and 
military populations, as with the DSM-IV PCL. The new checklist reflects the significant 
changes made to the diagnosis, except for those in Criterion A (Weathers, Litz, Keane, Palmieri, 
Marx, & Schnurr, 2013). Overall, wording has changed to reflect the possibility of multiple 
traumas. The primary change to Criterion B, intrusion symptoms, is the exclusion of the 
hallucinations and illusions as an intrusion symptom. Criterion C, avoidance symptoms, no 
longer includes memory loss of the trauma, diminished interest in activities, feelings of 
detachment, restricted affect, and sense of foreshortened future. However, this symptom set was 
moved to Criterion D, which also includes symptoms involving negative alterations in cognitions 
or mood. This criterion is new to the DSM-5, but most of the symptoms come from DSM-IV 
Criterion C of except for negative beliefs and emotional state and blame. Criterion E, increased 
arousal symptoms, was previously Criterion D with the addition of reckless or self-destructive 
behavior. Verbal or physical have been added to specify the typical expression of irritable and 
angry outburst (APA, 2013). Finally, a dissociative subtype was added. Validity and reliability 
have not yet been formally examined in published literature. Participants rate how much they 
have been bothered by each item during the last month on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 0 




or higher on at least one Criterion B item, one Criterion C item, two Criterion D items, and two 
Criterion E items (APA, 2013). A total symptom severity score is obtained by summing all 20 
items together. Scores range from 0 to 80, with a cut-off score of 38, in addition to meeting 
symptom pattern requirements, to determine diagnostic significance. 
Trauma History Screen. The THS contains a list of traumatic events that fit Criterion A 
of the current PTSD diagnosis (APA, 2013; Carlson, 2005). Changes in Criterion A from DSM-
IV include the broadening of qualifying traumas, such as sexual violence, vicarious traumatic 
experience, and repeated exposure to trauma. Vicarious trauma can be learning of or watching a 
loved one experience the threat of death, physical injury, or sexual violence. Because the trauma 
list has been broadened in the new DSM edition, this will be used to examine Criterion A with 
both PCL versions. This will be considered in the screening procedures. Participants will indicate 
whether (Yes or No) they have experienced any of the events. If they respond “Yes” on any 
events, they will be asked to provide details about each event, including age of occurrence and a 
description of what happened in their own words. They will also respond to specific questions 
about the event, such as “When this happened, did anyone get hurt or killed?” and “After this 
happened, how long were you bothered by it?” In addition to its diagnostic utility, this measure 
also illuminates how types of trauma affect autonomic regulation and which types are associated 
with PTG versus PTSD. 
General Mental Health Assessment. Participants completed the Behavioral Health 
Screening Measure (BHSM), a self-report measure designed to detect emotional problems in 
young adults (Zygowicz, & Saunders, 2003).  This was used to screen out potential participants 
who have emotional problems that would disqualify them from the healthy control group.  The 




depression (e.g., “I feel unhappy, sad, or depressed”), anxiety (e.g., “I feel fearful, nervous, or 
anxious without knowing why”), and substance use problems (e.g., “I feel unhappy or guilty 
about my drinking or drug use”). Respondents indicate how much each item has distressed or 
bothered her or him in the past two weeks on a 5-point Likert scale (0 = None of the Time; 4 = 
All the Time).  Scores, ranging from 0-88, are added together to indicate the level of emotional 
problem. Scores of 16 or above indicate potential clinically significant problems, and was thus 
used as the clinical cut-off score. The BHSM has a very high internal consistency of .93 
(Zygowicz & Saunders, 2003), and is sensitive to specific mental health difficulties.   
Generalized Anxiety Assessment.  The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ) 
assesses the trait of worry as it relates to DSM-III-R criteria for Generalized Anxiety Disorder 
(GAD; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990).  This measure was used to screen out 
potential participants who have generalized anxiety that would disqualify them from the healthy 
control group. The PSWQ contains 16 items, with 11 items measuring characteristic (e.g., “I am 
always worrying about something”) and five items measuring non-characteristic (e.g., “I do not 
tend to worry about things”) traits.  Participants respond with a 5-point Likert scale (1 = not 
typical at all of me; 5 = very typical of me).  The five non-characteristic items are reverse scored 
and the sum of scores indicate an individuals’ level of worry, ranging from 16 to 80; score of 45 
or above were considered clinically significant.  Research indicates that the PSWQ measures the 
construct of worry as separate from other depressive and anxiety symptoms.  Specifically, 
individuals meeting criteria for GAD have reliably higher PSWQ scores than individuals meeting 
criteria for PTSD.  Additionally, internal consistency (.91) and test-retest reliability (.92) are 




Depression Assessment. Participants also completed the Zung Depression Scale (ZDS), 
a 20-item scale assessing severity of depression (Zung, 1965).  This measure was used to screen 
out potential participants who have depression that would disqualify them from the healthy 
control group.  Participants rate the level to which each item was characteristic of them over the 
past week on a 4-point Likert scale (0 = none or a little of the time; 3 = most of the time). 
Depression severity is obtained when scores are summed. Scores between zero and 50 are 
normal, between 50 and 59 are minimal to mild, between 60 and 69 are moderate to severe, 70 or 
above is in the severe range; 65 was the clinical cut-off for this study. High split-half reliability 
of .73 and high internal consistency of .79 has been found (Knight, Waal-Manning, & Spears, 
1983) 
The International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005). 
The IAPS is a well-established standardized pictorial stimulus to study the autonomic 
psychophysiology of defensive behaviors in humans (Hermans, Henckens, Roelofs, & 
Fernandez, 2013). A set of 120 photographs were selected from IAPS and were composed of 60 
aversive, 60 neutral photographs, and 60 pleasant photographs. Images were assigned to block 
depending on their standardized arousal ratings (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005).  
The BIOPAC MP150 Amplifier (BIOPAC Systems, Inc., Santa Barbara, CA) records 
electrocardiogram data using three AG-AgCl electrodes with an 11mm diameter contact area 
with two electrodes attached below each clavicle and the third electrode attached to the lower left 
rib. The BIOPAC records the electrocardiogram signal at 500 Hz. An automatic R-wave detector 
identified interbeat interval in milliseconds to calculate RSA. 
The Distraction Task is a symmetrical abstract pattern-coloring page that participants 




purpose of this task is to get an accurate baseline measurement. Theoretically, the coloring pages 
should distract the participant from being in a new environmental setting, which could be 
autonomically arousing.  
Data Preparation & Analyses 
 Heart period and RSA was extracted from raw ECG data. Using CardioEdit and 
CardioBatch, RSA amplitude was derived from raw ECG wave. First, HRV from ECG data was 
edited using CardioEdit software. The editing procedure followed procedures outlined by 
Heilman et al (2013), who also examined cardiopulmonary oscillations from a polyvagal 
perspective. Editing consisted of integer arithmetic or manual insertion/deletion of 
missing/spurious detection based on the ECG recording.  Heart period was derived from the time 
intervals between successive R-waves in milliseconds. Using CardioBatch software, RSA was 
derived from a high-frequency band of HRV waves and will reflect spontaneous breathing 
patterns. Age and sex differences in spontaneous breathing frequency are accounted for by using 
age-specific parameters for calculating RSA amplitude.  
 Cardiac vagal influence was calculated by correlating the change scores (baseline to 
target point) for both heart period and RSA (i.e., when RSA-change and heart period change are 
highly correlated, this indicates increased cardiac vagal regulation). A total of eight change 
scores will be calculated, four for RSA and four for heart period, indicating change from baseline 
to image to baseline to distraction tasks. 
 A repeated-measures within-participant’s multivariate analysis of variance was used to 
examine RSA and heart period trajectory differences in PTG, PTSD, and healthy control groups. 




Furthermore, a repeated measures ANOVA to examine individual differences between different 

























Chapter 5: Results & Discussion 
Cardiac Assessments 
Group comparisons using a repeated measures ANOVA demonstrated a main effect of 
group RSA across all measurement phases (baseline, images blocks, and distraction tasks; see 
Figure 1), F (2, 20) = 3.905, p = .037, η2partial = .28, obs. power = .636, such that average RSA is 
lowest in the PTG group (M = 5.23, SD = 1.49), followed by the PTSD group (M = 5.68, SD = 
1.39), and the control group had the highest RSA across all phases (M = 6.25, SD = 0.92). 
Although mean RSA between groups was not in the order expected, with PTG being the lowest, 
univariate post hoc comparisons revealed significant differences between PTG and control 
groups.  
 
Figure 1.  RSA distributions, natural logarithm of ms2, by group across baseline, blocks of images, 
and distraction phases. 
Next, a group comparisons for heart period was examined using a repeated measures 
ANOVA, which demonstrated no main effect of group on heart period across all measurement 

















































η2partial = .043, obs. power = .11. The average heart period is lowest in the PTG group (M= 
729.79, SD= 126.25), followed by the PTSD (M= 734.76, SD= 77.91) group, and the control 
group had the highest heart period across most phases (M=767.62, SD= 130.89). Although mean 
heart period between groups was not in the order expected, with PTG being the lowest,  data 
analysis confirms expected hypothesis that PTG is not associated with physiological 
measurements of adaptive functioning measured through RSA and heart period.  
 
Figure 2. Heart Period distributions in ms by group across baseline, image blocks, and distraction 
phases. 
 Trajectories of RSA and HP across phases slightly differ by group from hypothesized 
expectations, in that post-image distraction task period measures are higher than baseline in 
control and PTSD groups, but not the PTG group (Figures 1 and 2). Based on previous research, 
we anticipated that baseline measures would have the highest indications of parasympathetic 
activity through vagal brake and would be manifested with the highest levels of RSA and heart 
period. However, RSA and heart period values across phases did not respond physiologically as 




































in heart period and RSA from baseline. Participants exhibited the most physiological arousal 
during initial baseline recording. Heart period is highest in the control group, in most phases, 
indicating longer interbeat intervals between R-waves (see Figure 2). Sometimes, this can be an 
indication of less sympathetic arousal. Furthermore, RSA in the control group was consistently 
higher than the PTSD and PTG groups, demonstrating increased vagal brake activity (Denver et 
al., 2007). 
Data revealed the vagal brake was removed during the aversive images in the control (r = 
.24, ns), PTG (r = -.16, ns), and PTSD groups (r = .54, ns) through correlations in change scores 
of heart period and RSA (see Figure 3). While the PTSD group demonstrated vagal brake 
reengagement (r = .86, p = .01) in the post-aversive image distraction period (see Figure 4), both 
the PTG group and the control group did not exhibit vagal brake engagement during the post-
aversive image distraction task. This indicates that heart period was not regulated by the vagus, 
but by other neuroanatomical structures. The correlation between RSA and HP in the post-image 
distraction period was significantly higher in the PTSD group than the PTG group. Specifically, 
both RSA and HP change are lower in the PTG group during the post aversive phase, indicating 
that cardiac output is being influenced by other ventral vagal pathways (see Table 2). These 
results are different than hypothesized, in that individuals in the PTG group performed 





Figure 3. RSA and Heart Period Change Scores (differences between baseline and viewing aversive 
images). 
 
Figure 4. RSA and Heart Period Change scores (differences between baseline and post aversive images 
while completing distraction task).  
Data revealed that the vagal brake was removed during positive images in the control 
(r=.61, ns) and PTG groups (r=.60, ns), but not the PTSD groups (r=.78, p= .037) in correlations 
between change scores on RSA and heart period (see Figure 5). The control group demonstrated 
vagal brake reengagement (r= .86, p= .013) in the post image distraction task, while the PTG 






























































demonstrating vagal brake activity while viewing pleasant images and did not have vagal brake 
activation during the post-pleasant image distraction task. The correlation between RSA and HP 
in the post-pleasant-image-distraction-task was lower in the PTG group compared to both PTSD 
and control groups, indicating the heart periods are mediated by other vagal pathways.  
 
Figure 5. RSA and Heart Period change scores, which are the differences between baseline and viewing 
pleasant images. 
 
Figure 6. RSA and Heart Period change scores, which are the differences between baseline and post 































































Table 2.        
Descriptive statistics of physiological variables after viewing unpleasant images for each 
group  
    RSA (SD)   HP (SD)   HR (SD) 
Initial baseline       
Control  6.15(0.99) 767.89(111.24) 81.00(15.99) 
PTG  5.22(1.03) 730.24(124.69) 84.72(14.33) 
PTSD  5.62(1.28) 734.18(77.06) 82.92(7.32) 
        
Aversive Images       
Control  6.88(1.27) 837.07(142.02) 74.39(14.61) 
PTG  5.34(1.00) 757.33(121.47) 81.46(14.33) 
PTSD  6.19(1.28) 773.97(129.47) 79.83(11.02) 
        
Post Aversive         
Control  6.54(0.93) 782.79(123.31) 78.77(14.97) 
PTG  4.96(1.25) 751.92(139.30) 82.53(16.24) 
PTSD  5.74(1.05) 750.09(72.97) 80.31(6.57) 
 
Pleasant_Images 
Control  6.82(1.35) 801.61(134.20) 74.06(14.52)           
PTG  5.21(1.49) 758.32(138.23) 81.44(15.67) 
PTSD  6.07(1.12) 811.45(112.84) 75.83(6.96) 
     
Post Pleasant      
Control  6.65(1.06) 799.79(136.55) 70.06(28.52) 
PTG  5.08(.919) 743.32(136.34) 83.44(15.67) 
PTSD  6.01(.876) 760.74(71.69) 79.83(6.964) 
 
Note. RSA= Respiratory Sinus Arrhythmia. HP = Heart Period. HR = Heart Rate. PTG= Posttraumatic 
Growth. PTSD= Posttraumatic Stress Disorder.  
 
Bivariate correlations examined the relationship between psychometric scores of 
pathology and RSA (see Table 3). There was a strong negative correlation between PTG and 
base RSA, r (23) = -.40, p < .05, PTG and RSA during aversive images, r (23) = -.55, p < .05, 
PTG and RSA during post-aversive image distraction task, r (23) = -.56, p < .05, PTG and RSA 
during pleasant images, r (23) = -.53, p < .05, and PTG and RSA during post-pleasant images 
during distraction task, r (23) = -.60, p < .05. The strong negative relationship between PTG and 




predicting less heart rate variability and less flexibility in adapting to stressors. Furthermore, 
PTG was unrelated to PTSD and other psychometric variables of psychopathology. Individuals 
in the PTSD group did not have a significant relationship with any of the phases of RSA 
measurement. There was a strong positive relationship between severity of PTSD and the 
Behavioral Health Screening Measure, r (23) = .86, p <.05, between severity of PTSD and the 
number of traumas, r (23) = .50, p < .05, and between severity of PTSD and Zung Depression 
scale, r (23) = .51, p< .05.  
Table 3.  
Correlations between Posttraumatic Growth, PTSD, RSA, and other psychometric variables of 
psychopathology.  
 PTG PTSD Base UI PUI PI PPI BHSM Zung Trauma  PSWQ  
PTG 
PTSD  -.16  
Base  -.40* .01 
UI  -.55* .10 .84*  
PUI  -.56* .11 .80* .86* 
PI  -.53* .16 .72* .79* .93* 
PPI  -.60* .18 .78* .90* .92* .92* 
BHSM  -.22 .86* .17 .32 .32 .40 .28  
Zung  .09 .51* .13 -.01 -.01 .05 .05 .60* 
Trauma  .04 .50* -.03 -.14 -.14 -.12 -.18 .28 .11 
PSWQ  -.26 .36 -.21 -.13 .00 .07 -.07 .24 .06 .42 
Note. PTG= Posttraumatic Growth. PTSD= Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. UI= Unpleasant Images. PUI= 
Post Unpleasant Images. PI= Pleasant Images. PPI= Post-Pleasant Images. BHSM= Behavioral Health 
Screening Measure. PSWQ= Penn State Worry Questionnaire.  
 
Screening Assessments 
It was hypothesized that different trauma histories produced different outcomes, 




there higher incidence of childhood maltreatment in the PTSD group. To do this a multiple 
regression analyzed data from the screening questionnaire completed by over 1,000 participants. 
Multiple regression analyses were calculated to predict scores on the PTGI from different trauma 
histories. A multiple regression indicated natural disasters (β =.07), transportation accidents (β = 
.07), wartime violence (β = -.08), sudden death of a loved one (β = .12), and witnessing a death 
(β = .09) significantly predicted scores on the PTGI (R2 = .06, p < 001).  
 Moreover, another multiple regression analysis was calculated to predict scores on the 
PCL-5 from different trauma histories. A multiple regression indicated accidents at home (β 
=.12), transportation accidents (β = .10), physical abuse as a child (β = .08), sexual abuse as a 
child (β = .09), sexual abuse as an adult (β = .11), witnessing a death (β = .08), and other 
emotionally distressing events (β = .12) significantly predicted scores on the PCL-5 (R2 = .15, p 
< 001). As can be seen, there is some overlap in the different types of traumatic experiences and 
the outcome of either PTSD or PTG, but not total agreement.  There is a statistically significant 
but weak positive correlation between scores on the PTGI and scores on the PCL-5, r (969) = 
.17, p < .001. These results indicate that PTG and PTSD are not mutually exclusive outcomes 
from traumatic experiences. 
Discussion 
A main effect of group across physiological measures was expected, such that downward 
trends in RSA and shorter heart periods would  be more pronounced in the PTSD group. 
Furthermore, it was expected that there would be no statistical difference between PTG and 
control groups.  These findings somewhat confirm the proposed relationship between cardiac 
vagal tone, measured through RSA, and PTG.  This study supports that PTG is not necessarily an 




each phase, RSA and heart period are lower in the PTG group, signifying less parasympathetic 
control over respiration and heart activity. More importantly, absence of cardiac vagal regulation 
after viewing aversive images accompanied by lower RSA in PTG during this period strongly 
suggests that the PTG construct is characterized by affect dysregulation, which would predispose 
individuals to the development of various pathologies related to emotional regulation. The results 
of this study may explain the complicated relationship between PTG and PTSD. Individuals with 
PTG have less cardiac vagal flexibility, which leads to an inability to respond to environmental 
stressors, and low RSA is predictive of various forms of psychopathology. A tremendous amount 
of the controversy surrounding PTG is based on its bidirectional relationship between PTSD. 
Individuals with PTG, potentially due to low RSA, are at risk of developing psychopathology 
because of their inability to flexibly respond to stressors, which would explain the relationship 
between PTSD. The present study does not support the proposition that the PTGI measures 
growth after traumatic events, but instead shows that measure is more predictive of pathology 
and cardiac vagal rigidity. These results support the position that PTG is a maladaptive post-
trauma response and that the cardiac rigidity found in this study may be an explanation for the 
complex nature of PTG and the bidirectional relationship it has with PTSD.  
 Somewhat unexpectedly, the greatest differences in RSA between groups were observed 
during the baseline period. It was hypothesized that the prospect of coming into the laboratory to 
participate in the study is in and of itself an autonomic arousing event. Therefore, this study 
implemented the use of the distraction task during baseline and post-image tasks to capture an 
accurate baseline of activity. However, RSA scores did not follow expected trajectory, even with 
the incorporation of a distraction task. It was expected that the RSA would be lower than 




on previous research, it was expected that exposure to aversive images would be associated with 
a decrease in RSA (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008). These unexpected results could be due to 
weak experimental manipulation, as the images used in this study did not induce the expected 
physiological activity of decreased RSA and shorter heart periods.   
Hypothetically, individuals who score highly on the PTGI inventory, indicating growth 
posttrauma, would also exhibit high RSA and return to baseline after viewing aversive measures. 
Therefore, it was expected that individuals in the PTG group and the control group would not be 
statistically different on RSA change and heart period. Surprisingly, the PTG group had lower 
RSA than the PTSD group throughout the study and significantly lower RSA than the control 
group.  Furthermore, there were no significant differences between PTSD and control during any 
of the phases of the study. Research examining PTSD and RSA are inconsistent in terms of 
baseline differences. Several studies have found that RSA differed significantly between PTSD 
and RSA during baseline (Blechert et al., 2007; Cohen et al., 2007), but others (Austin et al, 
2007; Sahar et al, 2001), did not observe differences in RSA during baseline or stressor phases. 
Austin et al (2007) did find differences in the post-resting phase, while Sahar et al (2001) did not 
between the PTSD and control groups.  
It was expected that there would be a lower correlation between RSA-change and heart-
period-change in the PTSD group verses the PTG and control groups. Current findings indicate 
that people who report PTG are characterized by a consistent autonomic state absence of vagal 
regulation, supported by the lack of significant correlations between heart period and RSA 
change. Accordingly, repeated-measures comparisons with the PTG group reveal that RSA did 
not reliably differ by phase. Similar comparisons with the PTSD group indicate that baseline 




an increase in RSA during the image blocks and a decrease during the distraction tasks. RSA 
changes in the control group also differ reliably across the phases, however the trajectory of 
change did not follow anticipated results. Individuals in the control and PTSD group showed an 
increase in RSA during the image tasks and a decrease during the post-image distraction tasks. 
This would suggest that more cardiac vagal activity was occurring while the participants were 
looking at the images and less activity during the post-image distraction task (refer to Figure 1). 
Lower heart period in the control group than clinical groups may be explained by 
extraneous variables, such as current medications for both groups. For example, 35% of 
participants in the PTG group were currently taking antidepressants, antiseizure medication, and 
drowsy medication, all of which can have a profound effect on heart rhythms (Julien, 2007). In 
the PTSD group, 45% of participants were currently taking antidepressants, antianxiety 
medication, and drowsy medication. These types of medications can have a profound effect on 
heart rhythms, but it is difficult to control for the effects of these necessary medications.  
 Post-trauma pathology has been shaped by the present social and political climate and has 
largely been a war-related disorder. Investigation into post-trauma psychopathology continues to 
indicate the variety of traumatic experiences extending beyond combat exposure (Herman, 
1992). The APA appears to have the right mindset, in that it has attempted to broaden the scope 
of post-trauma functioning, by standardizing the PTGI as a measurement of growth post-trauma, 
but these goals do not appear to be manifesting (Kilpatrick et al., 2013). The results from this 
study would suggest that the PTGI does not measure actual growth after trauma, but is indicative 
of something maladaptive that prevents individuals from returning to pre-trauma levels of 






Sample size was likely the strongest threat to study validity; Field suggests that 
multivariate group comparisons should have at least 20 cases per group to achieve adequate 
power (2010). However, Levene’s test of normality indicated that all RSA measures had normal 
distributions and Box’s M test for equality of covariance across measures proved to be true for 
the RSA measures. Both tests bolster the main effects and power of the MANOVA.  
Another limitation is that the sample was homogenous and only females participated in 
the laboratory portion of the study, which hinders the generalizability. The inclusion of only 
females in the second portion of the study was not intentional but the result of a combination of 
factors. For instance, females are more likely to experience a trauma and develop a disorder as a 
result (Mendlowicz & Stein, 2000). Secondarily, participants were recruited from a university 
population where females are the majority population and are more likely to participate in the 
study. In the future, efforts to recruit males specifically will help to determine how generalizable 
these findings are.    
Future Directions 
This study contributes significantly to the current literature, as it is the first study to 
examine autonomic differences between individuals who have self-reported PTSD symptoms 
and those who report PTG. The potential therapeutic implications of this study are important, as 
this provides objective evidence that self-reported PTG is a maladaptive response and may even 
be preventing treatment efficacy. Additional investigation into PTG will continue to increase our 
understanding of the phenomenological differences between it and PTSD and help with 
understanding the role PTG plays in the development of pathology. Future research should 




by using specific trauma centered memories or cues, to examine the autonomic activity between 
those with reported PTG and PTSD.  
Furthermore, future research should investigate the influence of the dorsal motor nucleus 
of the vagus (DMNX) to dissociative symptoms commonly observed in fear responses to trauma 
and learned helplessness (van der Hart, Nijenhuis, & Steele, 2005). Research has identified 
freezing in response to threat as tonic immobility manifested through rapid bradycardia or heart 
rate deceleration in trauma exposed individuals (Volchan et al., 2011).  Currently, there is no 
literature on the relationship between trauma-related bradycardia and DMNX vagal influence on 
the heart and the differential diagnosis between PTG and PTSD. A study of this nature could 
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